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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2008) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court on remand abuse its discretion by revising the

award of alimony and child support in the Amended Decree, without making
specific findings of clear error or a compelling reason for such changes, thus
violating the law of the case?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for the law of the
case is abuse of discretion. In re E.H., 2004 UT App 419 (Utah App. 2006).
II.

Did the trial court on remand fail to follow the mandate of the

appellate court by not making specific findings of fact?
Standard of Review: The proper standard of review for
challenges brought under the law of the case doctrine is abuse of discretion.
In re E.H., 2004 UT App 419 (Utah App. 2006). The mandate of an appellate
court binds the district and the parties and affords the district court no
discretion whether to comply with that mandate. IHC Health Servs., Inc., v.
D&KMgmt. 2008 UT73,1f 28, 196P.3d588 (Utah2008). Consequently,
because the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing whether the district
1

court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. See Amax Magnesium Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994).
III.

Did the trial court on remand abuse its discretion in calculating

child support by including Appellant's second or supplemental income?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for child support
calculations is abuse of discretion. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 962 P.2d 757, 759
(Utah App 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES and ORDINANCES
AT ISSUE
- There are no Constitutional Provisions at Issue.
- Statutes at issue include:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2), now U.C.A. § 78B-12-203(2)
- There are no Ordinances at issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This is an action for divorce. Specifically, the issues to be reviewed in
this case relate to alimony and child support.
2

Course of Proceedings
A bench trial was held on March 5 and 6, 2007. The court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 24, 2007. The Petitioner
appealed the original findings and Decree. On October 23, 2008 the
Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court instructing the trial court
to make specific findings regarding Petitioner/Appellee'sfinancialneeds and
the rationale for excluding the Walden University salary from Appellant's
income in calculating alimony. The trial court on remand entered Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 2, 2009. The
Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on November 9,2009. Appellant
filed his notice of Appeal on December 9, 2009.
Disposition of First Trial
After a two-day trial, Judge Cornaby, sitting as a substitute judge,
found Appellant has an income of $6,250 per month. The court imputed the
Appellee with the capacity to earn $750 per month. After hearing testimony,
the court concluded Appellee had inflated her monthly needs. The court
awarded $1,200 alimony, $565 per month in child support, one-half of
Appellee's 40 IK, and one-half of the Sky miles. The court ordered that the
parties share joint legal custody of the minor child with Appellee awarded
physical custody. The court made orders pertaining to parent time. The court
3

concluded that Appellee had received 85% of the contents of the parties
marital home and awarded each person the property in their possession.
Appellant ws ordered to pay Appellee $951 representing one-half of the 2004
tax return and $5,655 to Appellee for her moving expenses. The court
allocated the fee of the guardian ad litem between the parties. The parties
were each responsible for the debts in their own name and the debts each
assumed upon their separation. The Appellee had improperly transferred her
investment account of approximately $29,000.00 into an irrevocable trust for
the minor child, the court, nonetheless, left those funds for the child's benefit.
The parties were each responsible for their own attorneys fees. Appellee
moved the court to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law and/or
for a new trial on the issues of child support, alimony and the property
division. The court denied the motion. Appellee then filed for an appeal.
Disposition in the Appellate Court
The Appellate court was presented with two issues first that the trial
court's findings are insufficient to support its award of alimony, and second
whether the trial court erred when it found Appellant's current income to be
$6,250 per month instead of approximately $8,000 a month. The court was
unable to review the appropriateness of the amount of alimony the trial court
actually awarded because of insufficient findings. The court was also unable
4

to evaluate the issue of the Appellant's income about the excluded income
from Walden University without supplemental findings. The case was then
remanded to allow for more detailed findings concerning Appellee's financial
needs and the rationale for excluding the Walden University salary from the
calculation of Appellant's income.
Disposition of Trial Court on Remand
On remand, the trial court found that Appellee's financial needs were
no less than $3,715. The court made no comment on whether the financial
needs were inflated or not. The court also imputed that Appellee had the
earning capacity of $750. The court then increased the amount of child
support to $700 per month, retroactive to March 1, 2007 and awarded
Appellee alimony in the amount of $2,475 per month retroactive to March 1,
2007. The court included the income from Walden University because
Appellant's name "remained" on the website of the university. The court also
stated that the Appellant's income needs to be a function of Appellant's
historical earning capacity historically even though the income from the
university had only been from the past two years. The court then established
that Appellant's income was $8,000 per month gross and $6,000 per month
net of taxes.

5

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
(Appellant recites facts from the trial prior to remand as there was no
additional testimony taken nor additional facts received through affidavit or
other sworn statements by the trial court on remand.)
Kathy J. Baum (Appellee) and Michael T. Hayes (Appellant) were
married on September 11,1987. R 1, 36. They are the parents of one child
born April 18, 1992. R 2, 36. Appellee filed this action for divorce on
October 4, 2004. Rl.
Facts in the Record Relating to Appellee's Needs.
At the time of trial, Appellee reported monthly needs of $4,924 and
requested monthly support in the amount of $4,941. R5, 68. Her initial
financial declaration reported monthly expenses of $3,191. R 26. The initial
financial declaration filed October 21,2004 reports Appellee's total debt to be
$22,876 with monthly payments on the debt of $501. R 22. Appellee's
monthly payments on debt do not equal her reported total monthly
installments reported to be $555. R 25.
On or about August 30,2005, Appellee filed a second financial
statement reporting additional debt, primarily incurred to her mother, in the
amount of $63,960.36. R 168,169. The amended debt includes $26,000 in
attorney's fees and $26,000 to pay off credit cards. R 168. The $26,000
6

credit card debt reflects an increase of $8,263 over the $17,737 credit card
debt reported in October 2004, less than one year earlier. R 169.
The trial court heard testimony that Appellee is living in a home owned
by a trust established for the benefit of the family members. R 591, 168.
Appellee has not paid any rent or mortgage payments on the home with the
exception of one payment in 2004. Id. Her mother has purchased homes for
the other siblings in the family. Id.
The court concluded that "many" of the expenses listed were "ideal
monthly expenses" rather than "actual monthly expenses." R 592, 339. For
example, Appellee seeks $1,800 a year for home maintenance. R 591, 169.
Appellee testified she has someone to help her with the yard work, including
law mowing, fertilizing the lawn, and repairing sprinklers. Id. Appellant
seeks $800 a month for taxes. R591,170. Appellee testified that in 2005, her
federal tax burden was "zero." Id. Her state tax burden for 2005 was $130
for the year. Id. Appellee could not adequately explain the $4,900 she
reportedly requires for prescriptions, R 591,171-172.
Despite being unemployed, Appellee "gets her clothes dry cleaned"
requiring costs ofapproximately $50 per month. R591, 171. Appellee does
not have a car payment but owns a 2002 Toyota 4-Runner which is
unencumbered. R 591, 207.
7

Facts in the Record Pertaining to Appellant's Ability to Pay.
Appellant is an associate professor at Washington State University. R
591,203. He has an annual salary of $66,600. R 591, 204. Appellant can
"count on" one or two credit hour courses to teach, earning an additional
$4,800 during the school's summer schedule. R 591, 204. One year,
Appellant earned approximately $3,000 because he had an administrative
load. R 591,93.
Appellant has supplemented his income from a second job. Continuing
to work at a supplemental position threatens his full time employment. Id.
To become a full professor, he is required to maintain a high level of
academic work and publication. Id. Ifhe continued to work at the second
job, e would not be able to meet his requirements to become a full professor.
R 591, 204.
Appellant received a tax refund for the year ending 2004. R 591, 93.
Appellant applied the $1,906 refund towards a marital property tax bill the
parties were unable to pay. R 591, 93.
In 2006, Appellant received grant money and was given extra
administrative duties which contributed to a one-time increase in his yearly
income of approximately $18,000. R 591, 94. That money is not regularly
available. R 591, 94-95. The evidence adduced at trial was that Appellant's
8

supplemental income was not consistent, but based upon available grants,
assignments of administrative duties, and the availability of additional
courses. The court imputed additional income to Appellant in the amount of
$8,400 per year from summer or part time work. R 592, 339.
After mandatory deductions, Appellant has approximately $3,900 a
month available income. R 591, 206. He has assumed responsibility for a
majority of the marital credit card debt and is paying off a loan to Appellee's
mother, resulting in a monthly installment bill of $740. R 591,206. He is
making a car payment. R 591, 207. His retirement account has a balance of
$64,000. R 591,208.
Appellant's monthly budget is approximately $2,400. R 591, 210. He
has had a temporary child support obligation of $610 per month and $1350
per month for temporary alimony. R 591,205. Appellant's monthly
expenses, his child support obligation and his temporary alimony obligation
total $4360, resulting in a monthly income shortfall of $360.
Facts Pertaining to the Parties' Financial Contribution During the
Course of the Marriage.
Appellee contends that for the nine years of marriage, from 1987
until 1996, she contributed significantly more to the couples' finances, earning
together from $28,995 up to $86,666 a year. R 591, 166. Between 1997 and
9

2003, while Appellee was not employed, the family relied on the income
earned by Appellant in addition to savings, investments and retirement funds
acquired by Appellee during the course of the marriage, through her
employment, and through her personal inheritance. During that same period
of time, Appellant's earning totaled approximately $290,000. Id. During that
second half of the marriage. Appellee did not work nor did she actively seek
employment. R 103.
The parties' living expenses while married and living together were
more than the income available through Appellant's income. R 591, 166.
Appellee would, as needed over the years, sell assets including stock she
received from her employer during the course of the marriage, to supplement
the family's income. R 591, 166. Appellee and Appellant were functioning
"as so many marriages do." R 592, 340. By the time the parties separated,
they were insolvent. R 591, 167.
The court found that many of the credit card entries had accumulated
since separation of the parties and cited that fact as a reason for the court's
ruling. R 592,343.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court abused its discretion on remand by dramatically
changing the alimony award and child support award. To make such a
10

change the trial court would have to make detailed findings that the original
trial court had made a clear error in its Decree of Divorce. The trial court on
remand made no such findings. The trial court on remand further abused its
discretion by including the income from Walden University solely because
the Appellant's name was found to "remain" on the website of the university.
Such a lack of findings as to clear error on the first trial court's findings do
not support the trial court's findings on remand.
Additionally, the trial court on remand violated the mandate rule of
law. The Appellate Court remanded the case with instructions to allow for
more detailed findings concerning the Appellee's financial needs as well as a
rationale for including or excluding the Appellant's income from Walden
University. However, the trial court, on remand made no new findings or
conclusions as to the financial needs of the Appellee other than what the
previous trial court made. Also, the trial court, on remand went beyond
evaluating the rationale for including the income of Walden University and
instead focused on the expenditures of the Appellant. The issue of the
Appellant's expenditures was not on remand. Thus, the trial court on remand
went beyond the mandate of the Appellate Court.
Finally, the trial court on remand abused its discretion in considering
the income from Walden University in computing child support. The statute
11

requires the court to consider income from the equivalent of one full-time 40hour job. Instead, the trial court on remand included income from a second
job. Even if the court can justify it, there must be adequate findings to do so.
There were no findings of fact related to calculating the child support.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION ON REMAND
BY DRAMATICALLY CHANGING THE ALIMONY AWARD AND
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WITHOUT FIRST MAKING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF CLEAR ERROR OR EXPLAINING A COMPELLING
REASON FOR THE NECESSITY OF MAKING SUCH A CHANGE.
The trial court on remand abused its discretion when it ruled on Appellee's
award for alimony and on Appellant's historical income under the law of the
case doctrine. A challenge to a judge's reversal of a ruling made by a
predecessor judge is composed of two issues. The first is whether the reversal
so offends the prudential practice of refusing to reopen matters that have
already been decided that it cannot be sustained. In re E.H., 137 P.3d 809,
816 (Utah 2006) citins Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
The second issue in looking at a reversal of a prior order focuses on the nature
of the matter decided. Id.
The first issue involves the law of the case doctrine. When a judge is
presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon
by a coordinate judge in the same case that judge not allowed to arbitrarily
12

change the previous ruling unless a compelling reason exists. In the current
case, the trial court on remand did not articulate a compelling reason to
change the alimony amounts, it only made minimal findings concerning
Appellee's financial needs.
The law of the case doctrine is a flexible principle and not an absolute
limit on the court's power that rigidly binds a court to its former decisions.
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993). The court may change the
ruling if a compelling reason exists to do so such as a prior mistake that
needed to be fixed to avoid injustice. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306, 131 l(Utah App. 1994). Therefore, the trial court on remand
should not depart from the law of the case to avoid relitigating decided issues
and to conserve court resources unless a compelling reason exists. In re E.HL
103 P.3d 177 (Utah App. 2004).
In the current case, the appellate court stated that the trial court's
"ultimate finding may be supportable

" Baum v. Hayes, 196 P.3d 612,

615 (Utah App 2008). Thus, there was no assumption that the first trial court
was wrong, only a request that there be adequate findings. The trial court on
remand did not make any findings that there was a clear error on the part of
the first trial court, nor did it make any findings to show either a clear mistake
or a compelling reason for the previous trial court's rulings to be overturned.
13

It is also noteworthy that the judge who received the case on remand
was not the same judge who originally heard the testimony. The trial court on
remand did not have the benefit of "reading" the witnesses and weighing the
evidence. While the appellate court will defer to the discretion of the trial
court, the trial court on remand had no more advantage than the appellate
court as it could only rely on the record previously made. This is particularly
important to consider because an important issue in this case relates to the
Appellee's ability to work in light of her previous brain surgery. While the
appellate court and the trial court on remand can read the record, they cannot
observe the subtleties of Appellee's demeanor.
In the current case, the trial court on remand made inadequate new
findings about the Appellee's financial needs and the court did not make any
new detailed findings other than what was already discussed and discovered
by the trial court.
Another indication that the trial court on remand abused its discretion is
that its rationale for including the Walden University income as part of
Appellant's income in computing the alimony was that Appellant was still
listed on the university's website. This information was not part of the trial
record. Rather this "fact" was presented to the court as Tab 9 attached to
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Supplemental
14

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The printout attached to the
memorandum as Tab 9 indicates it was printed or produced on March 5,2009.
This court remanded the case to the trial court in its decision dated October
23,2008. The trial court on remand made a specific finding that Appellant
"remains listed as a member of the faculty of Walden University on its current
website." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page four,
paragraph 11 (attached to this Brief).
Ironically, the trial court on remand made the same error committed by the
first trial court: it failed to make adequate findings to support its decision.
THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
MANDATE RULE OF LAW WHEN IT DID NOT MAKE MORE
DETAILED FINDINGS CONCERNING APPELLEE'S FINANCIAL
NEEDS AND WHEN IT WENT BEYOND EVALUATING THE
RATIONALE FOR INCLUDING THE INCOME FROM WALDEN
UNIVERSITY.
The second issue in looking at a challenge to a judge's reversal of a
ruling made by a predecessor judge focuses on the nature of the matter
decided. In re E.H.. 137 P.3d at 816. The mandate rule of the law of the case
doctrine requires a trial court receiving a case by remand from the appellate
court to stay within the bounds the appellate court sets. The trial court below
is bound to follow the directions of the appellate court. See Thurston v. Box
Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034,1037-38(Utah 1995). In the current case, the
15

trial court did not follow the mandate of the appellate court to make a more
detailed finding concerning Appellee's financial needs. Therefore, the court
should vacate the second trial court's findings and conclusions and reinstate
the first trial court's findings and conclusions of law.
The mandate rule applies to cases that have been appealed and
remanded. However, when a case remains pending before the trial court prior
to an appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court
remains free to reconsider that decision. IHC Health Servs., Inc. 2008 UT
73, Tf26. However, a trial court's power to reconsider decided issues is
limited when the case has been appealed and remanded. Id. The mandate
rule binds both the trial court and the parties to honor the mandate of the
appellate court. Id. Thus, the decisions of an appellate court become the law
of the case and cannot be reconsidered on remand. Id.
THE TRIAL COURT, ON REMAND DID NOT CONSIDER THE
REQUIRED FACTORS IN DETERMINING ALIMONY AS WAS
MANDATED BY THE APPELLATE COURT
In considering required factors to determine whether an award of
alimony is appropriate in a divorce proceeding, the trial court is required to
make adequate factual findings on all material issues, "unless the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment;9 Rehnv.Rehn, 1999 UT App 4118, 974 P.2d 306.
16

The factors to be considered include (1) the financial needs and condition of
the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to provide a
sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
IdIn the current case the Appellate court remanded this case with the
instructions that the trial court should provide more detailed findings
concerning Appellee's financial needs. Baum v. Haves, 196 P.3d 612, 616
(Utah App. 2008). However, the trial court made little more findings as to the
financial needs of the Appellee than what was already made by the first trial
court. Through those limited findings the trial court, on remand, changed the
alimony amounts from $1,200 per month to $2,475 per month. Additionally,
the trial court, on remand, changed the child support amount from $565 per
month to $700 per month.
Then the trial court on remand looked at Appellant's lifestyle. Instead
of following the mandate of the appellate court to focus onfindingmore
detailed information concerning the rationale for excluding the Walden
University salary, the court focused on the Appellant's expenses. The court
was more concerned with how Appellant was able to, "pay for many lifestyle
amenities...", R. 591, at 53:12., than with its mandate. The trial court on
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remand made no effort to determine a rationale for excluding the Walden
income; rather, it focused on Appellant's expenditures.
In addition to not following the mandate, it appears the trial court on
remand included the Walden University income based solely on the fact that
Appellant's name "remained" on the university website when the trial court
on remand made its findings - a "fact" not presented at the trial two years
previously.
Unfortunately, the trial court on remand was more interested in
Appellant's lifestyle and information not provided at trial than legitimate
issues such as Appelant's responsibility for the marital credit card debt or his
monthly installment payment of $740 to Appellee's mother.
THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ALTERING THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD BY INCLUDING
APPELLANT'S SECONDARY INCOME.
The trial court on remand determined that Appellant's secondary
income should be included in determining the alimony award. The court then
used the same income figures in re-calculating child support.
Typically, a court only looks at income derived from "the equivalent of
one full-time 40-hour job." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2), now Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-12-203(2). There can be exceptions, but the court needs to make
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specific findings to justify the variance. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Reinhart 963
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah App 1998).
Here, the trial court on remand made no findings of fact at all to
address the change in child support. While a court may look at income in
addition to 40 hours in some circumstances, the trial court on remand gave no
indication what that circumstance may be.
Appellant was employed by Washington State University as a full-time
professor. As such, that income would be considered the equivalent of a fulltime 40-hour job. To include additional income, the trial court on remand
would have to consider whether Appellant was self-employed or whether the
additional work was customary for members of his profession - assuming his
profession was highly compensated. Id. While Appellant would argue
neither is the circumstance, it is moot as the trial court on remand made
absolutely no findings.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons the appellant believes it is appropriate to
reverse the trial court's findings and decree as there was no clear error in the
original findings and decree. Rather, there was a lack of findings to support
the decree. By failing to follow the appellate court's mandate and without the
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benefit of any significant additional findings, it is a clear abuse of discretion
for the trial court on remand to drastically change the former decree.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 d a y of June, 2010

RANDALI/LEE
Attorney tor Appellant
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Kenneth A. Okazaki
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Titfe/Chapter/Section:

Home | Site Map | Calendar 1 Code/Constitution | House | Senate j Search

{ CJO i 0 (

Utah Code
j itle 30 Husband and Wife
('hapter 3 Divorce
S ection 5 Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -- Division of debts - Court to have
continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony ~ Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children - Division of debts — Court
t3 have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for
Modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
c ebts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
cependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance,
a ad deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental
i lsurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a
c ependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts,
c bligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and
t leir support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after entry of the
c ecree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the
i nmediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a
court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
crder is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing
party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good
fiith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other
nember of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court
n a y award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party
tecause of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
c uration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living
t lat existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due
t) the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
r larriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born
c uring the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist
at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided
i 1 this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies
t lat consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any
t me prior to termination of alimony, the courtfindsextenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
bnger period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
/onended by Chapter 285,2010 General Session
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ADDENDUM B
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2)

78-45-7.5.

Determination of gross i n c o m e — I m p u t e d
income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes

(a) prospective income from any source, including
nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3), and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions interest, trust income, alimony
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation income replacement disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeanstested" government programs
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job However, if and only if
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern m
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter
3, Part 3, Family Employment Program,
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program,
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid,
Food Stamps, or General Assistance, and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of
a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts The income and expenses from
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross" income
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection
may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax purposes
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current
income Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs
or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court
finds the verification is not reasonably available Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to

ADDENDUM C
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(2)

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE
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Utah Code
Title 78B Judicial Code
C 'hapfer 12 Utah Child Support Act
5 ection 203 Determination of gross income -- Imputed income.

78B-12-203. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective incomefromany source, including earned and
r onearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, giftsfromanyone,
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimonyfromprevious marriages, annuities, capital gains,
5 ocial Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability
i isurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Incomefromearned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. If and only if during the
t me prior to the original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job,
t le court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excludedfromgross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income,
S ocial Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business operationfromgross receipts. The income and expensesfromselfe mployment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the
parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level
r lay be deductedfromgross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax
p urposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income shouldfirstbe computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the
average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer
statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the courtfindsthe verification is not
reasonably available. Verification of incomefromrecords maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be
substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation
exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, or,
i I contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding entersfindingsof fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as
cerived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical
area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the
federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specificfindingsof fact as to the evidentiary basis for the
i nputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a temporary nature:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child support award nor

t enefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to the
parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other
i neamed income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

KATHY J. BAUM,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

vs.

Case No. 04-4905929 DA

MICHAEL T. HAYES,
Respondent.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

This matter came on for trial on March 5-6, 2007 before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby. Petitioner was present and represented by Kenneth A. Okazaki.
Respondent was present and represented by James H. Woodall.
The Court, having reviewed the file, having considered the evidence offered,
and having heard the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

1.

Petitioner had been a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than

three months prior to the filing of this matter.
2.

The parties have irreconcilable differences which prevent the

continuation of their marriage. Petitioner shall be granted a decree of divorce from
respondent on such grounds, to become final upon entry.
3.

The parties have one child in common, Ruby Samantha Baum-Hayes,

born April 18, 1992. It is in Ruby's best interests that the parties be awarded her joint legal
custody, with petitioner awarded Ruby's physical custody.
4.

Respondent shall be entitled to exercise parent time with Ruby under the

relocation statute as set forth at § 30-3-37, Utah Code Ann. The Court recognizes that parent
time problems have occurred. Both parties shall be required to work together to do
everything they can to remedy these problems.
5.

Petitioner, in particular, shall be required to cooperate fully with

respondent to ensure visits. She shall maintain a positive point of view about respondent in
her discussions with Ruby. She shall not schedule any activities for Ruby during respondent's
parent time. Finally, she shall indicate to Ruby that it is not her choice to visit with
respondent, but rather a responsibility she has to her father.
6.

Petitioner shall be ordered to accept telephone calls from respondent to

arrange visits. Discussions shall be limited to Ruby, and shall not get into the causes for the
divorce. The Court expects the parties to jointly work together to arrange visits. It is not

respondent's responsibility to do so alone, nor is it his responsibility to schedule visits through
Ruby.
7.

The parties shall make every effort to avoid discussing issues relating to

the divorce in Ruby's presence, or involving Ruby in their conflict in any way. The parties
shall make every effort to resolve their conflicts, understanding that until the conflict is
resolved once and for all, Ruby will continue to be distracted and agitated by the conflict.
8.

Petitioner shall have a continuing duty to notify respondent of Ruby's

medical and educational needs, and to share such information with respondent. The parties
are to attempt to make important decisions jointly, but in the event of a dispute, petitioner
shall have the final authority.
9.

Petitioner reports monthly needs of $4,924. She requests monthly

support of $4,941. If the Court entered such an order, respondent would be left with nothing
to meet his expenses. It is evident to the Court that there is not enough money for the parties
to live as they did prior to their separation, and that they lived beyond their means at that
time. The Court concludes that petitioner's listed needs are exaggerated in many respects,
including her claim for $800 per month to pay taxes on her hypothetical alimony award, as
well as other expenses that while ideal, are not actually being paid.
10.

The Court finds that respondent should maintain his full time

employment at an annual salary of $66,600, and that he has the ability to earn an additional
$8,400 during the summer months, for a total of $75,000 annually, or $6,250 per month.

11.

The Court regards petitioner as partially disabled as a result of a brain

tumor that was discovered during the parties' marriage. From the testimony of the parties'
experts, the Court is persuaded that petitioner is capable of working, and will impute $750 per
month to her.
12.

Considering the nature of petitioner's disability, the parties' respective

needs and abilities to pay, the Court will order respondent to pay petitioner $1,200 per month
as alimony, commencing March 1, 2007 and continuing until petitioner's death, remarriage, or
cohabitation. The Court will not require respondent to maintain life insurance for petitioner's
benefit. Petitioner may maintain continuing medical insurance under COBRA, but it shall be
at her sole expense.
13.

Respondent shall further be ordered to pay petitioner $565 per month as

child support until Ruby attains the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school,
whichever occurs last. Respondent shall maintain medical insurance for Ruby's benefit for as
long as she is eligible, as his sole expense, as well as life insurance for as long as he has a
child support obligation Ruby. The parties shall each pay one-half of Ruby's out-of-pocket
medical expenses, including the costs of her therapy with Dr. Johanna McManemin.
14.

The Court recognized that both parties contributed all of their available

resources to the marriage. While respondent's financial contribution was not nearly as
significant as petitioner's, the Court will not structure a property award based on the parties'
relative contributions, nor will it attempt to restore either party to his or her former condition.
The Court notes that petitioner received 85% of the contents of the parties' home at

separation. The parties shall each retain the furniture, furnishings, bank accounts, vehicles,
and personal property in his or her possession, free of any claim by the other. Respondent
shall therefore retain the Ford Escort automobile, which the Court values at $3,700, with no
obligation to hold it for Ruby. Nor shall respondent be required to pay for Ruby's trip to
Europe. The Court does not believe either party has the ability to pay for it.
15.

Respondent shall be responsible for $1,500 of the Guardian Ad Litem's

fees, representing those fees incurred prior to his reappointment. Thereafter, petitioner shall
be responsible for all such fees.
16.

The Sky miles accounts shall be divided equally as of March 6, 2007.

The Court does not find that the Summiya business has any value. It shall be awarded to
respondent.
17.

Respondent shall pay petitioner $951, representing one-half of the 2004

income tax refund, plus $5,655, representing a portion of petitioner's moving expenses.
18.

Each party shall be responsible for the debts and obligations in his or

her name, and those debts he or she assumed upon the parties' separation. The Court will not
order respondent to reimburse petitioner for the payments she claims to have made on his
behalf, or for the loans she made to him during the marriage.
19.

Petitioner transferred her investment account into an irrevocable trust for

Ruby's benefit. While it was improper for her to do so, the Court will leave those funds for
Ruby's benefit. Respondent's 401(k) account shall be divided equally, using February 28,
2007 as the valuation date.

20.

The fees incurred in this matter are a great concern to the Court.

Petitioner claims over $70,000 in fees, which she asks respondent be ordered to pay. The
Court concludes that neither party has the ability to pay the fees they have incurred.
Accordingly, each party shall be responsible for his or her fees, without reimbursement from
the other.
DATED this

day of

, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

DOUGLAS L. CORNABY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

Kenneth A. Okazaki
Attorney for petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following on April 2, 2007:
Kenneth A. Okazaki
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

KATHY J. BAUM,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 04-4905929 DA

MICHAEL T. HAYES,
Respondent.

Judge fcusfte-70^wiS f ^ W ^
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

This matter came on for trial on March 5-6, 2007 before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby. Petitioner was present and represented by Kenneth A. Okazaki.
Respondent was present and represented by James H. Woodall.
The Court, having reviewed the file, having considered the evidence offered,
having heard the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, and the Court having previously
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the followirigjDEGKEE
OF DIVORCE:
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DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Petitioner is awarded a decree of divorce from respondent on grounds of

irreconcilable differences, to become final upon entry.
2.

The parties have one child in common, Ruby Samantha Baum-Hayes,

boni April 18, 1992. The parties awarded her joint legal custody, with petitioner awarded
Ruby's physical custody.
3.

Respondent shall be entitled to exercise parent time with Ruby under the

relocation statute as set forth at § 30-3-37, Utah Code Ann. The Court recognizes that parent
time problems have occurred. Both parties shall work together to do everything they can to
remedy these problems.
4.

Petitioner, in particular, shall cooperate fully with respondent to ensure

visits. She shall maintain a positive point of view about respondent in her discussions with
Ruby. She shall not schedule any activities for Ruby during respondent's parent time.
Finally, she shall indicate to Ruby that it is not her choice to visit with respondent, but rather
a responsibility she has to her father.
5.

Petitioner shall accept telephone calls from respondent to arrange visits.

Discussions shall be limited to Ruby, and shall not get into the causes for the divorce. The
Court expects the parties to jointly work together to arrange visits. It is not respondent's
responsibility to do so alone, nor is it his responsibility to schedule visits through Ruby.
6.

The parties shall make every effort to avoid discussing issues relating to

the divorce in Ruby's presence, or involving Ruby in their conflict in any way. The parties

shall make every effort to resolve their conflicts, understanding that until the conflict is
resolved once and for all, Ruby will continue to be distracted and agitated by the conflict.
7.

Petitioner shall have a continuing duty to notify respondent of Ruby's

medical and educational needs, and to share such information with respondent. The parties
are to attempt to make important decisions jointly, but in the event of a dispute, petitioner
shall have the final authority.
8.

Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner $1,200 per month as alimony,

commencing March 1, 2007 and continuing until petitioner's death, remarriage, or
cohabitation. The Court will not require respondent to maintain life insurance for petitioner's
benefit. Petitioner may maintain continuing medical insurance under COBRA, but it shall be
at her sole expense.
9.

Respondent shall further be ordered to pay petitioner $565 per month as

child support until Ruby attains the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school,
whichever occurs last. Respondent shall maintain medical insurance for Ruby's benefit for as
long as she is eligible, as his sole expense, as well as life insurance for as long as he has a
child support obligation Ruby. The parties shall each pay one-half of Ruby's out-of-pocket
medical expenses, including the costs of her therapy with Dr. Johanna McManemin.
10.

The parties shall each retain the furniture, furnishings, bank accounts,

vehicles, and personal property in his or her possession, free of any claim by the other.
Respondent shall therefore retain the Ford Escort automobile, which the Court values at
$3,700.

11.

Respondent shall be responsible for $1,500 of the Guardian Ad Litem's

fees, representing those fees incurred prior to his reappointment. Thereafter, petitioner shall
be responsible for all such fees.
12.

The Sky miles accounts shall be divided equally as of March 6, 2007.

The Summiya business is awarded to respondent.
13.

Respondent shall pay petitioner $951, representing one-half of the 2004

income tax refund, plus $5,655, representing a portion of petitioner's moving expenses.
14.

Each party shall be responsible for the debts and obligations in his or

her name, and those debts he or she assumed upon the parties' separation.
15.

Respondent's 401 (k) account shall be divided equally, using February

28, 2007 as the valuation date.
16.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her fees, without

reimbursement from the other.
DATED this ay. day of

/%y
/

, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

<&+-

AS L. C6RJTABY/
DISTRICT COURT JUDG
Approved as to form:

Kenneth A. Okazaki
Attorney for petitioner
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ADDENDUM F
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHY J. BAUM,
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 04-4905929 DA

MICHAEL T. HAYES,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Commissioner Michael S.
Evans

Respondent.

j

This case was originally assigned to Judge Leslie A. Lewis. A bench
trial was conducted in this case on March 5 and 6, 2007, by retired Judge
Douglas L. Cornaby.

This matter is before the Court on petitioner's

Motion for Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following
remand of Judge Douglas L. Cornaby's decision from the Court of Appeals
by Remittitur dated December 30, 2008.
submitted

by

the

parties

on

Having considered the pleadings

Remittitur,

the

Findings

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce previously

of

Fact

and

entered by this

Court, and the record, all in light of the instructions issued by the
Court of Appeals on remand for detailed findings as to Wife's needs and
Husband's ability to pay, the Court now makes the following:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner's Needs
1.

Petitioner's Financial Declaration in this matter lists total

after-tax needs of $4,124. {See Trial Exhibit 7, pp. 5-6)

BAUM V. HAYES

2.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

PAGE 2

This amount reflects petitioner's and the parties' daughter

Ruby's actual expenses, including rent of $1,000 a month payable to
petitioner's mother for the house her mother purchased for petitioner and
Ruby

when

they

relocated

to

Utah,

and

substantial

insurance

out-of-pocket medical costs due to petitioner's health problems.

and
(R.

591, at 136:9 - 137:24, 168:2 - 175:13; Trial Exhibit 12)

3.

Petitioner

was not

able

to cover

all

of her

and

Ruby's

expenses through temporary alimony and child support awarded her during
the pendency of this action in the amount of $1,960 per month, and had
to rely on loans from her mother for rent and many other expenses.

(Id.

at 138:2-21)
4.

As a result, petitioner had over $123,000 in debt as of the

time of trial, much of it owed to her mother.

{See Trial Exhibit 7, pp.

2-3)
5.

Respondent

did

not

offer

any

evidence

to

contradict

petitioner's expenses or debt, but questioned whether petitioner was
indeed obligated to pay her mother rent and whether she needed both $409
for prescriptions without insurance and $441 for insurance.

(R. 591, at

175:3-13)
6.

The

evidence

therefore

establishes

that

petitioner's

reasonable needs, without consideration of income taxes payable on her
alimony, are no less $3,715 (her claimed after-tax needs of $4,124 minus
the $409 claimed for prescriptions without insurance).
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This

Court

previously

rendered her unable

employment.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

determined

to return

that

petitioner's

to anything

like her

brain
former

Indeed, the evidence showed she is incapable of anything but

menial labor.

As a result, this Court previously determined petitioner

is partially disabled, and therefore imputed income of $750 - a finding
not challenged on appeal.

(R. 592, at 339:25 - 340:23)

$2,965 in unmet, after-tax needs.

That leaves

The receipt of child support in the

amount of $700 which is not taxable to petitioner reduces her total posttax reasonable needs to $2,265.
Respondent's Ability to Pay
8.

Respondent made $91,000 in 2005 and $96,000 in 2006.

Trial Exhibit 25/ see
9.

also

Respondent's

( See

R. 592 at 65:2-5).
2006

earnings

comprised

$66,600

from

his

full-time teaching position during the academic year, additional income
from teaching during the summer, and $21,000 from a second job with
Walden

University,

an

on-line

annually, or $8,000 a month.

university,

for

a

total

of

$96,000

{See Trial Exhibit 41/ R. 591, at 61:19 -

65:7, 92:7 - 93:12)
10.

Respondent

testified

that he anticipated

full-time teaching will increase in the future.
11.

{Id.

his

salary

from

at 66:4-6)

Respondent speculated at trial that he may not be able to

sustain his second job with Walden University at all, or at the same
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level as he has in the past, but he remains listed as a member of the
faculty of Walden University on its current website.

{See

http://www.

waldenu.edu/c/Schools/Schools_8314.htm.)
12.

Respondent's Financial Declaration listed after-tax needs of

$2,369 per month.
13.

{See Trial Exhibit 110, p. 5)

Respondent testified at trial that he was able to pay the

$1,960 per month awarded as temporary alimony and child support, and
would be able to continue to pay those amounts after the divorce.

(R.

591, at 205 .-12-15)
14.

Respondent also continued to fully fund his retirement, in the

amount of $456 per month.
15.

Respondent

(Trial Exhibit 110, p.2)

failed to pay the Guardian ad Litem or Ruby's

counselor, but was able to pay for many lifestyle amenities during the
pendency of this action, including a boat and a boat slip he shares with
his girlfriend as well as two kayaks and a new 2002 Subaru.

(R. 591, at

53:12 - 57:3, 242:3 - 243:14)
16.

The Court finds that respondent's ability to pay should be a

function of the earning capacity historically established, not the one
presented at trial based on a few months' earnings and speculation that
he may not be able to build on past increases in earnings, and therefore
imputes gross income to him of $96,000 per year, or $8,000 per month
gross, $6,000 per month net of taxes (at a 25% combined effective rate).
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that petitioner should be awarded
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child support in the amount of $700 per month based on gross income of
$750 a month imputed to petitioner and respondent's gross income of
$8,000 per month.
17.

Respondent's Financial Declaration listed after-tax needs of

$2,369 per month.

( See

Trial Exhibit

110, p. 5) Including a child

support payment of $700, respondent's total after-tax needs total $3,069.
18.

Assuming a combined effective tax rate of 25% on his $8,000

gross monthly income, and continued contributions to his retirement of
$456 per month, respondent has an ability to pay at least $2,475 per
month while still fully meeting his own claimed needs

($8,000 x 25% -

$456 - $2,369 - $700) . Requiring respondent to pay $2,475 per month for
alimony exceeds petitioner's reasonable needs of $2,265, however, the
excess

amount

is

necessary

to

assist

petitioner's

tax

liability

consequences from receipt of alimony.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the
following:
Supplemental Conclusions of Law
1.

The amount of petitioner's alimony should be $2,475 per month

retroactive to March 1, 2007.
2.

The amount of petitioner's child support should be $700 per

month retroactive to March 1, 2007.
3.

Respondent's

Motion

to

Strike

petitioner's proposed

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is denied.
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The

terms

of

the Decree

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
of

Divorce

should

be amended

consistent with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Counsel

for

petitioner

is

directed

to

submit

accordingly.
Dated this

*<~

day of September, 2009.

an Amended

Decree
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the
following, this {/\

day of September, 2009:

Kenneth A. Okazaki
Stephen C. Clark
Attorneys for Petitioner
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
James H. Woodall
Attorneys for Respondent
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095
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ADDENDUM G
Amended Decree of Divorce

FILM BWTRIGT COURT
Third Judicial District
Kenneth A. Okazaki (USB #3844)
NOV - 9 2009
Stephen C.Clark (USB #4551)
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Jessica P. Wilde (USB #11801)
By.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537
OF JUDGMENTS
DGMENT/S
Attorneys for Petitioner
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHYJ. BAUM,

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
v.

Civil No. 044905929

MICHAEL T.HAYES,

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

Respondent.

The above-captioned matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, following remand of the Court's
decision from the Utah Court of Appeals by Remittitur, dated December 31, 2008. The Court,
having reviewed the file and pleadings submitted by the parties on Remittitur, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
the Decree of Divorce previously entered by this Court, and for good cause appearing therefore;
Amended Decree of Divorce @J

002W I

JD3O207502
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

Petitioner was previously awarded a decree of divorce from Respondent on

grounds of irreconcilable differences on May 24, 2007.
2.

The parties have one child, Ruby Samantha Baum-Hayes, bom April 18, 1992.

Both parties are awarded joint legal custody, and Petitioner is awarded sole physical custody.
3.

Respondent shall be entitled to exercise parent time with the child pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37.
4.

The Court recognizes that parent time problems have occurred. The parties shall

work together to do everything they can to ensure that parent time problems do not occur.
Specifically, Petitioner shall cooperate fully with Respondent to ensure parent time visits. She
shall maintain a positive point of view about Respondent in her discussions with the child.
Petitioner shall not schedule any activities for the child during Respondent's parent time.
Petitioner shall indicate to the child that it is not her choice that the child visits with Respondent;
rather, it is a responsibility that she has to her father.
5.

Petitioner shall accept telephone calls from Respondent to arrange parent time. It

is not solely the Respondent's responsibility to schedule visits with the child.
6.

The parties shall make every effort to avoid discussing issues relating to the

parties' divorce in the child's presence, or involving the child in a conflict in any way. The
parties shall make every effort to resolve their conflicts with the understanding that any
unresolved conflict will district and agitate the child.

-2902941 |

7.

Petitioner shall have the continuing duty to notify Respondent of the child's

medical and school-related needs, and to share such information with Respondent. The parties
are to attempt to make important decisions jointly, but in the event of a dispute, Petitioner shall
have the final authority.
8.

Petitioner is awarded alimony in the amount of $2,475 per month, beginning

October 1, 2009, and continuing until Petitioner's death, remarriage, or cohabitation.
9.

Judgment is hereby entered against Respondent and in favor of Petitioner for

alimony retroactive to March 1, 2007, in the amount of $39,525.
10.

Respondent is not required to maintain life insurance for Petitioner's benefit.

11.

Petitioner is awarded child support in the amount of $700 per month, beginning

October 1, 2009, and continuing until the child reaches the age of eighteen years or graduates
from high school, whichever occurs last.
12.

Judgment is hereby entered against Respondent and in favor of Petitioner for child

support retroactive to March 1, 2007, in the amount of $4,185.
13.

The total judgment hereby entered against Respondent for retroactive alimony and

child support is $43,710.
14.

Respondent shall maintain medical insurance for the child for as long as she is

eligible, at his sole expense. Respondent shall maintain life insurance naming the child as
beneficiary for as long as he has a child support obligation to the child.
15.

The parties shall each pay one-half of the child's out-of-pocket medical expenses,

including the costs of her therapy with Dr. Johanna McManemin.
-390299} i

16.

The furniture, furnishings, bank accounts, vehicles, and personal property that

were awarded to the respective parties on March 24, 2007 in the Decree of Divorce shall
continue to be retained by the parties, free and clear of any claim by the other.
17.

Respondent shall be responsible for $1,500 of the Guardian Ad Litem's fees,

representing those fees incurred prior to his reappointment. Petitioner shall be responsible for
the Guardian Ad Litem's ftes incurred subsequent to his reappointment.
18.

Respondent shall pay Petitioner $951, representing one-half of the 2004 income

tax refund, plus $5,655, representing a portion of Petitioner's moving expenses, the total amount
due having been reduced to judgment by prior court order in the amount of $6,601,
19.

The Sky miles accounts and Summiya business that were awarded to the

respective parties on March 24, 2007 in the Decree of Divorce shall continue to be retained by
the parties, free and clear of any claim by the other.
20.

Respondent's 401 (k) account shall be divided equally, retroactive to February 28,

21.

Each party shall continue to be responsible for the debts and obligations in his or

2007.

her name.
22.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her attorneys' fees and costs incurred.

Approved as to form:

James H. Woodall
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7n - r u
I hereby certify that on the C-L/ day of October, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce, to the following:
James H. Woodall
Woodall & Wasserman
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Fax:801-254-9451

